Press Action ::: Why the League of Women Voters Is Wrong on E-Voting

Tuesday, January 20, 2004

Why the League of Women Voters Is Wrong on E-Voting

A Point-by-Point Rebuttal

By Eric A. Smith

The League of Women Voters advisory on e-voting is dangerously wrong in its assessment of direct recording electronic (DRE) technology. Some members of the LWV have written to me suggesting I have financial ties to the industry and asking me to substantiate my claims that the League’s assessment is in error.

First, I want to state candidly that I am a freelance journalist and IT instructor in Tokyo. I have never had any personal contact with any employees or management personnel of DRE manufacturers, nor have I ever received any income that cannot be fully accounted for, and I invite any who say otherwise to investigate for themselves.

As to specific reasons why the LWV’s Questions and Answers on Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems is dangerously incorrect, here is a point-by-point rebuttal:

LWV: “There is no reason to believe a well-run system based on DREs will steal your vote.”

Rebuttal: Sure there are.

1. Diebold systems are run on Windows, an insecure and buggy operating system.

2. Diebold’s ATMs have already been infected with worms.

3. Their vote records are kept in an MS Access database, which is NOTORIOUSLY easy to crack and alter, as Bev Harris has already done and demonstrated.

4. The manufacturers threaten inspectors that warranties are voided if the machines are opened. So inspections are limited to those “outside the box”, and contracts include “...trade-secret clauses that would make it a third-degree felony to disclose details of the specifications or internal functioning of the machines.”

5. After the elections, machines lock into “no-vote" mode, so it becomes impossible to test if they’ve functioned correctly without being able to open them.

6. The Sequioa machines have an open port that can be used to reprogram them DURING an ELECTION.

7. “It is possible, for example, to activate a candidate position that has not been touched by pressing the screen in two positions simultaneously. Unintended voting choices — exactly the problem that precipitated Florida’s election troubles back in 2000 — were thus not prevented by this new equipment.”

8. “Election Systems & Software Inc. (Omaha, Neb.). Problems included machines that took three times longer than expected to boot up, that reset themselves spontaneously, and, in one precinct, that apparently failed to record about 1800 votes.”

9. The CEOs and owners are anything but impartial:

secretly owned

Diebold board of directors contributed hundreds of thousands to GOP coffers (see list of donations at bottom of page).

Nebraska’s landslide win revisted and other irregularities.

Diebold CEO Dell promises in GOP fundraising letter to “deliver all Ohio’s votes to the President in 2004."

LWV: “Computer scientists with limited experience with election systems have narrowly focused on the DRE machines without taking into account the safeguards, etc...”

Rebuttal: Well, no; the country’s leading academic experts on specifically electronic voting systems and electronic security have focused on DREs and how INADEQUATE the safeguards are. Read Dr. Rebecca Mercuri’s (who has testified before Congress on the issue) recent engineering specialist’s article for a prominent example.

LWV: “The costs of printing the ballots on special paper raise the costs in the long run....”

Rebuttal: Not by any significant amount. And remember, we’re only talking about the FEDERAL ELECTION here. If Diebold can add paper receipts in its primary line of business, the manufacture of ATMs, why can’t it do the same thing cheaply with voting machines. A competitor in California estimated the cost at about $51 per machine.

LWV: “Voting machines are scrutinized by state officials and computer scientists before a machine is certified for use in their states.”

Rebuttal: But those inspections are limited to screen readouts and after-election tallies, which means inspectors must rely ENTIRELY upon the integrity of the machines. In other words, if the machine says “All Clear”, inspectors have no other means of inspection available.

LWV: “The independent security analysis done for the state by the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), an independent IT firm with an international reputation in IT security found that DREs can work effectively, etc.... None of the recommendations by the SAIC included the use of a Voter Verified Paper Trail (VVPT).”

Rebuttal: Unfortunately, SAIC isn’t as “independent” as this statement would lead you to believe.

Lynn Landes writes:

"Former President, Chief Operating Officer, and Vice Chairman of SAIC is Admiral Bill Owens, who is now Chairman of the Board for VoteHere. Owens also served as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was a senior military assistant to Secretaries of Defense Frank Carlucci and Dick Cheney. Carlucci’s company is Carlyle Group, while Vice President Dick Cheney’s former employer is Halliburton.

“Another former SAIC board member, also on the board of VoteHere, is ex-CIA director Robert Gates, a veteran of the Iran/Contra scandal.

“VoteHere is already benefiting from the Diebold debacle, as it will be partnering with Sequoia Voting Systems, ‘to provide a new level of electronic ballot verification to customers of the AVC Edge touch screen voting system,’ according to the VoteHere website.

“SAIC, which is supposed to vet Diebold’s elections software, is itself in the elections business."

So maybe it’s no surprise that their assessment of Diebold (not that I’m arguing) was that “the system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise” (section 2.5).

LWV: “I have heard that the voting machine computer codes are kept secret and that computer professionals are prohibited from working with the machines by copyright laws and other regulations.....”

Rebuttal: Well, yes, they are, as Dr. Mercuri’s article clearly explains.

LWV: Computer experts, retained by election officials under confidentiality agreements, currently review and evaluate computer codes and systems....”

Rebuttal: To the extremely limited extent of seeing the machine-generated final tallies and after-election printouts. They are not allowed to examine the inner workings of the machine or the coding.

LWV: Paper receipts are “difficult if not impossible to recount”.

Rebuttal: No they’re not; a simple hand count and/or optical scanning is all that is required.

LWV: Printers jam and printouts can be “confusing to the voter”.

Rebuttal: How often do printers in ATMs (Diebold’s primary market) jam? And did this ever stop printed receipts from being included in ATMs? Dr. Mercuri ‘s plan calls for printouts securely behind glass. And, if a printout is too confusing, the voter can ask for assistance.

LWV: “The voter-verified paper trail adds costs and complications to the voting process, does not add significant security, and undermines disability and language access.”

Rebuttal: Well, no; as stated earlier, it’s been estimated to cost $51 per machine.

And if, as Dr. Mercuri has suggested, the paper ballot is produced behind glass, the level of security is tremendously increased. Since the machines already produce an auditory confirmation for the sight- and reading-impaired, the paper trail itself in no way “undermines” the process.

As Dr. Mercuri put it:

"The combination of the lack of standards, legislative loopholes, trade secrecy, usability problems, privacy, security, and other inherent computer issues results in a dangerous “trust-us” mentality. Transparency in the process is essential, not only to provide auditability, but also to enhance voter confidence. This can be provided, quite simply, through the use of a voter-verified physical audit trail for use in recounts.”

“A method of voting described by this author over a decade ago, referred to as the Mercuri Method, requires that the voting system print a paper ballot containing the selections made on the computer [see illustration]. This ballot is then examined for correctness by the voter through a glass or screen, and deposited mechanically into a ballot box, eliminating the chance of accidental removal from the premises. If, for some reason, the paper does not match the intended choices on the computer, a poll worker can be shown the problem, the ballot can be voided, and another opportunity to vote provided.

“At the end of the election, electronic tallies produced by the machine can be used to provide preliminary results, but official certification of the election must come from the paper records. Since the ballots are prepared by computer in machine-and human-readable format, they can be optically scanned for a tally, or hand-tabulated for a recount. After the election, yet other entities (such as the League of Women Voters or a news organization like Reuters) can verify the ballots using their own scanning equipment, if the format is produced in a generic way.

“This type of system is cost-effective. No longer must blank ballots be prepared in advance, as with mark-sense or other paper-based voting systems. Incidentally, mark-sense products — pre-printed ballots with circles or ovals that a voter fills in with a pencil or pen — do provide a physical record that is available for recount. They have the lowest undervote rate of all the computerized tabulation systems, according to a number of studies, including one by the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project [see “On the Road Toward Electronic Voting“].”

Once again, I urge you to investigate more fully yourself. Without a Voter-Verified paper trail, our very right to choose our leaders is in peril. And, once these machines are installed, there’s no turning back.

Don’t fail to act. Your DUTY, as an American, a concerned citizen, a patriot and a member of the League of Women Voters is to protect the right to vote. Your country needs you now as never before. And the time is very, very
short.

Tomorrow may be just one day too late.

Who to fax, phone and email about a Voter-Verifiable Paper Trail:

Congress

State elections boards

State Attorneys General (party affiliations listed)

State Election Officials

Members, Natl. Assoc. of County Recorders, Election Officials and Clerks

Penelope Bonsall, national director of the Office of Election Administration Office of Election Administration, Federal Election Commission, 999 E Street, NW, Washington, DC 20463, , (202) 694-1095 (phone), (202) 219-8500 (fax)

Online e-petitions at EFF and VerifiedVoting.org

Alternative e-voting machines:

Author Bev Harris is also in immediate need of attorneys for coordinating legal injunctions to stop insecure voting machine use before the 2004 primaries. She can be contacted at Bevharriscontact@aol.com.

Eric A. Smith is a freelance journalist, editor and IT instructor living in Tokyo, Japan. An activist for over 25 years, he has worked with such diverse publications as the RTP Beacon, Common Ground and Adbusters magazine.

Smith is currently volunteering to assist Bev Harris of Blackboxvoting.org, Attorney Philip Berg in 9-11 widow Ellen Mariani’s RICO suit against Bush, et al, and is a charter member of the Open Voting Consortium.

Smith earned his BA at the University of North Carolina in 1992, and holds MCP, field service technician, A+ and Network+ certifications from Microsoft, COMPTIA and the Control Data Institute.

He can be reached at 81-03-3959-5371 or snowdog@juno.ocn.ne.jp

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